Apr 14

The European Court of Justice in UPC Telekabel: Internet users must have their say on blocking-orders as well?

The spring has started (at least in the Northern Hemisphere), and decisions on the enforcement of copyrights on the internet flourish. A couple weeks ago, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) delivered its decision in the Svensson-case, which some greeted as a liberation of the hyperlink from copyright law’s claws. After carefully reading the decision, we have to conclude that there may still be cases in which linking to copyright-protected content amounts to copyright infringement. Just as in Svensson, the CJEU in its latest decision of UPC Telekabel v. Constantin Film Verleih produced a nuanced ruling of which the implications are not yet clear right away.

I think there are at least four interesting points in the decision that deserve to be highlighted. Firstly, the CJEU provides some insight into the scope of Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive and which intermediaries may be subject to injunctions based on that article.

Secondly, the CJEU makes it clear that general injunctions prohibiting internet access providers to provide access to certain websites are compatible with EU law. In essence, the Court has no problem with burdening internet access providers with the search for a solution to prevent access to copyright infringing websites. There should, however, be an escape route for internet access providers when they cannot reasonably comply with the injunction. Furthermore, national courts play an important role in testing whether such solutions strike the right balance between the fundamental rights of all parties affected by measures taken by internet access providers.

Thirdly, and maybe most importantly, the CJEU provides national courts and Member States with instructions on how to deal with injunctions prohibiting the provision of access to certain websites. The CJEU comes up with procedural safeguards to protect the right of freedom of information of internet users.

Fourthly, the CJEU seems to set a standard on how effective an injunction must be for it to be compatible with rules of EU copyright law and the copyright owner’s fundamental right to protection of his intellectual property.

Facts of the case and preliminary questions

The question that is central to UPC Telekabel is whether an internet access provider can be subject to an injunction prohibiting the provision of access to a copyright infringing website. The website in question offered thousands of films for streaming or downloading. Among those films made available were films by the plaintiffs in this case, Constantin Film Verleih and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft. The plaintiffs applied for an injunction prohibiting Austrian internet access provider UPC Telekabel from providing its customers with access to the website. The Commercial Court of Vienna had granted the injunction and ruled that the internet access provider had to stop providing access to the website by means of DNS blocking of the domain name, and blocking of the current and future IP addresses at which the website could be reached.

On appeal, the Higher Regional Court of Vienna reformulated the injunction into an injunction that prohibited the provision of access to the website, but that did not specify the means to prevent access to the website. UPC Telekabel appealed against the decision of the Higher Regional Court with the Austrian Supreme Court, which in turn asked the European Court of Justice preliminary questions on the scope of Article 8(3) of the  Infosoc Directive and the the compatibility of the issued injunction with EU law.

Scope of Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive: All internet access providers can be subject to injunctions regardless of relationship or involvement

In essence, the first question to the CJEU is whether an internet access provider is an “intermediary” in the sense of Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive. This Article provides that “[m]ember States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.” The Article calls on EU Member States to provide copyright owners with a possibility to apply for a potentially very powerful injunction against intermediaries that disregards questions of knowledge, involvement or other elements that would normally come into play when dealing with liability for fault or negligence.

The first question thus is a question on the scope of Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive: against which intermediaries may a copyright owner apply for an injunction such as a blocking-order? Framing the question as asking whether Article 8(3) or other rules of EU law require an internet access provider to block a particular website, and taking the Court’s positive answer as a ‘yes’ to that question, is based on a misreading of Article 8(3) and the Court’s decision in this case.

Already in 2009, the CJEU in LSG v. Tele2 had held that internet access providers are “intermediaries” in the sense of Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive. This case, however, dealt with the possibility of an injunction against an internet access provider to release personal data of its subscribers in order to bring civil proceedings for copyright infringements against these subscribers. In this case there thus was a less vague link between the internet access provider and the infringers than in the Telekabel-case in which there was no such link at all.

In UPC Telekabel the Court to a great extent draws from its earlier conclusions in LSG v. Tele2 in which the Court explained that the mere provision of internet access should be seen as the provision of a service used to infringe copyrights:

“Access providers who merely enable clients to access the Internet, even without offering other services or exercising any control, whether de iure or de facto, over the services which users make use of, provide a service capable of being used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right, inasmuch as those access providers supply the user with the connection enabling him to infringe such rights.”

In explaining its argument, the CJEU referred to the aim of the Infosoc Directive, which is to ensure legal protection of copyrights. According to the CJEU, copyright protection “would be substantially diminished if ‘intermediaries’, within the meaning of Article 8(3) of that directive, were to be construed as not covering access providers, which alone are in possession of the data making it possible to identify the users who have infringed those rights.”

The argument that copyright protection would be ineffective if internet access providers cannot be subject to Article 8(3) injunctions is repeated by the CJEU in UPC Telekabel. However, what UPC Telekabel adds is that for Article 8(3) to apply it makes no difference whether there is a contractual link or specific relation between the internet access provider and the copyright infringer. It does not matter whether an infringer is a customer of the internet access provider, or whether the internet access provider is involved somewhere in the up- or downstream of transmitting copyright-protected content:

Neither the wording of Article 8(3) nor any other provision of Directive 2001/29 indicates that a specific relationship between the person infringing copyright or a related right and the intermediary is required. Furthermore, that requirement cannot be inferred from the objectives pursued by that directive, given that to admit such a requirement would reduce the legal protection afforded to the rightholders at issue, whereas the objective of that directive, as is apparent inter alia from Recital 9 in its preamble, is precisely to guarantee them a high level of protection.

Nor is the conclusion reached by the Court in paragraph 30 of this judgment invalidated by the assertion that, in order to obtain the issue of an injunction against an internet service provider, the holders of a copyright or of a related right must show that some of the customers of that provider actually access, on the website at issue, the protected subject-matter made available to the public without the agreement of the rightholders.”

In this context it may not come as a surprise that the CJEU also argues that no proof of actual infringement through use of the internet access provider’s service is needed for an injunction:

“[The Infosoc Directive] requires that the measures which the Member States must take in order to conform to that directive are aimed not only at bringing to an end infringements of copyright and of related rights, but also at preventing them [...]

Such a preventive effect presupposes that the holders of a copyright or of a related right may act without having to prove that the customers of an internet service provider actually access the protected subject-matter made available to the public without their agreement.

That is all the more so since the existence of an act of making a work available to the public presupposes only that the work was made available to the public; it is not decisive that persons who make up that public have actually had access to that work or not [...].”

Fundamental rights and general principles of EU law

The CJEU was also asked to answer the question whether the fundamental rights recognized by EU law preclude an injunction prohibiting an internet access provider to provide access to an infringing website without specifying any measures, and when that provider can avoid incurring coercive penalties for breach of that injunction by showing that it has taken all reasonable measures. This question not just asks about the compatibility of a general injunction with fundamental rights, it also asks about the compatibility of such an injunction in combination with a possibility of escaping the payment of penalties when the internet access provider is able to show that it has taken reasonable steps to comply with the injunction’s prohibition.

After noting that the conditions to be met and the procedure to be followed when issuing injunctions are a matter for national law, the CJEU dug up its “fair balance between fundamental rights, and general principles of EU”-test that we know from earlier decisions such as Promusicae v. Telefónica and Scarlet v. Sabam (see my blogpost on that case)The conflicting rights in the UPC Telekabel-case are of course the filmmakers’ right to intellectual property, the internet access provider’s freedom to conduct a business, and internet users’ freedom of information. In short, the CJEU holds that the injunction  balances these conflicting fundamental rights well, but the Court also introduces two  procedural points that national courts and Member States need to take into account when dealing with general injunctions prohibiting the provision of access to specified websites. I think that especially these procedural points have been given too little attention in most reports on the UPC Telekabel-decision.

Procedural safeguards to protect the rights of internet access providers AND internet users

Although the CJEU perceives the injunction in question as a restraint on the internet access provider’s freedom to conduct a business, the Court for two reasons argues that the injunction does not infringe “the very substance” of this fundamental right. Firstly, the injunction leaves it up to the internet access provider to determine what measures to take in order to prevent access to the infringing website. Although the internet access provider is prohibited from providing  access to the infringing website, the provider still has a choice in how to comply with that prohibition. Secondly, the injunction requires the internet access to do only what can be reasonably asked from him. According to the Court, the “possibility of exoneration clearly has the effect that the addressee of the injunction will not be required to make unbearable sacrifices, which seems justified in particular in the light of the fact that he is not the author of the infringement of the fundamental right of intellectual property which has led to the adoption of the injunction.”

The Court here clearly diverts from the opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón who argued that if, even after the injunction has been issued, the internet access provider has the opportunity to argue that the injunction is unreasonable, the injunction would still not strike the necessary balance between the conflicting fundamental rights. The Advocate General pointed out that even with such an opportunity, internet access providers would run the risk of being caught in a crossfire between copyright owners and internet subscribers:

As I have already mentioned at the beginning, there are a number of measures which can be considered for the purpose of blocking a website, that is to say, for possible compliance with the outcome prohibition. They include highly complex methods, such as diverting Internet traffic through a proxy server, but also measures which are less difficult to implement. The measures thus differ significantly as regards the degree to which they interfere with the fundamental rights of the ISP. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that full compliance with the outcome prohibition is impossible from a purely practical point of view.


An examination of the ISP’s situation also shows that no balance between the fundamental rights is struck by that procedural opportunity. The ISP must suffer the issuing of an injunction against it, from which it is not apparent what measures it is required to take. If, in the interest of its customers’ freedom of information, it decides on a mild blocking measure, it must fear a coercive penalty in the enforcement process. If it decides on a more severe blocking measure, it must fear a dispute with its customers. The reference to a possible opportunity to defend itself in the enforcement process does not in any way alter the ISP’s dilemma. It is true that the originator can rightly refer to the danger of massive infringement of its rights by the website. However, in cases like the present, the ISP has no connection with the operators of the copyright‑infringing website and has itself not infringed the copyright. To that extent, the measure to be examined cannot be said to strike a fair balance between the rights of the parties.”

The CJEU partly deals with this “crossfire-problem” by introducing a procedural requirement that gives internet access providers the opportunity to test the reasonableness of the injunction, before the provider is ordered to pay penalties for not complying with the court order:

“In that regard, in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, it must be possible for the addressee of an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings to maintain before the court, once the implementing measures which he has taken are known and before any decision imposing a penalty on him is adopted, that the measures taken were indeed those which could be expected of him in order to prevent the proscribed result.”

The CJEU also tries to deal with the problem of over-inclusive blocking by requiring that the internet access provider’s measures to prevent access to an infringing website are “strictly targeted” to the infringements, and that they may not interfere with lawful access to information by internet users. The Court here explicitly refers to the freedom of information of internet users that are of course also affected by the blocking of certain websites:

“In this respect, the measures adopted by the internet service provider must be strictly targeted, in the sense that they must serve to bring an end to a third party’s infringement of copyright or of a related right but without thereby affecting internet users who are using the provider’s services in order to lawfully access information. Failing that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of information of those users would be unjustified in the light of the objective pursued.

But the CJEU does not just say that the freedom of information of internet users is important, the Court also instructs national courts to take into account the negative effects on the internet users’ access to information. And even more importantly, the Court seems to argue that internet users should have a possibility to have their say as well. In order to make that point, the Court first notes that in order for national courts to test whether the injunction is compatible with the internet users’ right to freedom of information, that issue needs to be challenged before the national court. For instance, Dutch civil courts usually only take into account arguments that are presented to them by the parties. In a case of general injunctions prohibiting the access to a website, those parties are a copyright owner who applies for an injunction and an internet access provider that would be the subject to that injunction. The CJEU therefore seems to argue that internet users, who are usually not represented in procedures on such injunctions, should have a possibility to assert their rights once the internet access provider’s blocking mechanisms are known:

“It must be possible for national courts to check that that is the case. In the case of an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the Court notes that, if the internet service provider adopts measures which enable it to achieve the required prohibition, the national courts will not be able to carry out such a review at the stage of the enforcement proceedings if there is no challenge in that regard. Accordingly, in order to prevent the fundamental rights recognised by EU law from precluding the adoption of an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the national procedural rules must provide a possibility for internet users to assert their rights before the court once the implementing measures taken by the internet service provider are known.”

After the CJEU’s decision in Scarlet v. Sabam, I was a little disappointed with the Court’s assessment of the implications of an internet filter on the right to freedom of information of internet users, the Court in UPC Telekabel does seem to fully take into account that freedom. This difference in appreciation can of course be explained be the outcomes in those cases. In Scarlet, the CJEU argued that an internetfilter to filter out copyrighted music did not comply with EU law, in particular with Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, and the Court therefore did not need to be too strict regarding the right to freedom of information of internet users. However, in UPC Telekabel, the Court finds a general prohibition to provide access to a particular website to be consistent with EU law, and the Court uses the internet user’s right to freedom of information as a counterbalance that prohibition. 

The effects of the injunction: keeping it real(istic)!

Regarding the effects that the injunction must have, the CJEU makes clear that measures taken by internet access providers do not need to have the effect of preventing all unauthorised access to the copyrighted content. “Sufficiently effective” is the key:

“None the less, the measures which are taken by the addressee of an injunction, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, when implementing that injunction must be sufficiently effective to ensure genuine protection of the fundamental right at issue, that is to say that they must have the effect of preventing unauthorised access to the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the subject-matter made available to them in breach of that fundamental right.”

The Court here seems to set a standard that can also be used to assess the effectiveness of other blocking-orders. This standard could for instance be applied in the Dutch case of Brein v. XS4ALL and Ziggo, in which the Court of Appeals of The Hague recently held that the blocking of the Pirate Bay was not sufficiently effective. Brein appealed against the decision with the Dutch Supreme Court and I am sure that CJEU’s decision in UPC Telekabel will have have much influence on the Dutch Supreme Court’s decision.

Alright, that’s it for now on the UPC Telekabel-case!

Mar 14

Embedding Getty Images: Free or a Trojan Horse?

Getty Images, one of the big players in image licensing, recently announced that it allows free embedding of about 35 million pictures in its database. “Free” in the sense that you do not need to pay a licence-fee to Getty to use the images. But, really free? No. There are a few catches. But first, how does embedding a picture work?

How does it work?
It is really simple. You can search Getty’s database and click on the embed-button (“</>”) when you find a picture that you would like to use. You are then presented with a small piece of HTML-code that you can copy and paste into your website’s code. Below you find an example of an embedded picture. A nice pic of an early morning in the Italian Alps, made by Giorgio Fochesato, clearly sponsored by “gettyimages”:

In an article in the British Journal of Photography, Getty’s policy change towards free non-commercial use is explained by Craig Peters, senior vice president of business development:

“We’re really starting to see the extent of online infringement. [...] In essence, everybody today is a publisher thanks to social media and self-publishing platforms. And it’s incredibly easy to find content online and simply right-click to utilise it.”

Getty’s solution is an embed-tool that enables to freely embed Getty images for non-commercial purposes. That of course seems like great news for bloggers and others that want to spice up their websites with nice pictures. Honestly, this blog looks a lot better with pictures on it, doesn’t it?

The conditions for use
The conditions for use of Getty’s images can be found in Getty’s terms. Images may only be used “for editorial purposes (meaning relating to events that are newsworthy or of public interest).”

Images may not be used “(a) for any commercial purpose (for example, in advertising, promotions or merchandising) or to suggest endorsement or sponsorship; (b) in violation of any stated restriction; (c) in a defamatory, pornographic or otherwise unlawful manner; or (d) outside of the context of the Embedded Viewer.”

What is commercial use?
Commercial use seems the be most important bar to use of Getty’s images. The difficulty is of course: how does one define commercial use in this context? Is use on a blog that generates some revenue through advertising commercial use? And what about a big news website? According to Getty Images, both parties would be allowed to freely embed pictures:

“Blogs that draw revenues from Google Ads will still be able to use the Getty Images embed player at no cost. “We would not consider this commercial use,” says Peters. “The fact today that a website is generating revenue would not limit the use of the embed. What would limit that use is if they used our imagery to promote a service, a product or their business. They would need to get a license.” A spokeswoman for Getty Images confirms to BJP that editorial websites, from The New York Times to Buzzfeed, will also be able to use the embed feature as long as images are used in an editorial context.”

Getty thus seems to allow everyone who writes in an “editorial context” to use the Getty images. That is quite revolutionary!

Where is the catch?
Well, there are a few catches. When you embed a picture, you literately import a webpage stored at Getty’s servers into your own webpage. In essence, this means that Getty stays in control over its content. If Getty changes anything to these picture-pages, your webpage automatically changes too. For instance, in its terms, Getty reserves the right to “in its sole discretion to remove Getty Images Content from the Embedded Viewer.” Getty may thus remove pictures from your webpage without you even noticing it.

Getty does not only stay in control of its own content, it also gains control over the content on your webpage. From Getty’s terms:

“Getty Images (or third parties acting on its behalf) may collect data related to use of the Embedded Viewer and embedded Getty Images Content, and reserves the right to place advertisements in the Embedded Viewer or otherwise monetize its use without any compensation to you.”

By embedding Getty’s pictures, you allow Getty to display advertisements on the embedded part in your webpage. And worse, Getty may “monetize” use of the embed-tool, which of course predicts little about what Getty will actualy put on your site. While, as of now there may be no advertisements on top or around embedded pictures, there may be in the near future:

“Getty Images will also look to draw additional revenues from its player through advertising. “We reserve the right to monetise that footprint,” Peters explains. “YouTube implemented a very similar capability, which allows people to embed videos on a website, with the company generating revenue by serving advertising on that video.” And while Getty Images has yet to determine how these ads will appear, Peters is confident that this capability will be introduced in the near future.”

But there is more. From the above outtake from Getty’s terms, it also becomes clear that Getty, or others on behalf of Getty, may collect data from your website. That points in the direction of a new business for Getty: with its embedding tool, Getty hopes to jump on the data collection train. With every embedded picture on a webpage, Getty has a beacon on that webpage that allows it to receive “data related to use of the Embedded Viewer and embedded Getty Images Content”, including data on visitors of your website. That is of course a vague description of the data that Getty could gather, which makes the privacy-implications of embedding Getty images hard to predict. Getty could collect only innocent data on for instant the times an image is used, but it could also bring Getty closer to building a Googlesque database on internet use. Either way, one thus better updates his privacy policy to inform his vistors when allowing in this possible trojan horse.

Feb 14

Remaining questions after the CJEU’s decision in the Svensson-case

The wait is over. After only having access to the Court’s press release on its Svensson-decision, finally the actual decision is out. In my earlier post on the case, I set out the questions that the European Court of Justice had to answer:

In short, the main question that was asked to Court was whether the creation of a link to a work on a website, constitutes a communication to the public in the sense of the Infosoc Directive. In other words, whether linking to copyright-protected materials is an act that is relevant under EU copyright law. It doesn’t need much explanation that this decision touches on the core of the operation of the web. If linking to copyright-protected materials is a communication to the public, then almost all linking on the web amounts to copyright infringement. One would need a licence to link to another’s webpage and that would mean the end of the web as we know it.

The Court is also asked whether it makes a difference if the link refers to a website that can be accessed by anyone without restrictions, or if access is restricted. Also, the question whether any distinction should be made between links that point to another website, and links that display the work “in such a way as to give the impression that it is appearing on the same website” is asked. This last question deals with what is often called “framing”, which is the incorporation of content on a webpage that is stored at another location on the web.

The Court’s answers

Now, what are the Court’s answers? In answering the first question (is a link a communication to the public?), the Court first explains that the concept of a communication to the public includes two cumulative criteria. There should be an “act of communication” of a work and the communication of that work to a “public”.

For there to be an ‘act of communication’, the Court argues that “it is sufficient [...] that a work is made available to a public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective of whether they avail themselves of that opportunity”. In arguing that the linking done in this case is an “act of communication” the Court points to the fact that the links on the website in question provided links that afforded users of that website direct access to works published on another website. On the “act of communication”, the Court concludes:

It follows that, in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, the provision of clickable links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making available’ and, therefore, an ‘act of communication’, within the meaning of that provision.

Regarding the second requirement, that of the ‘public’, the Court reiterates that the term means “an indeterminate number of potential recipients and implies, moreover, a fairly large number of persons.” The Court then notes that a “manager of a website” fulfils this requirement when he places links on a website. He then is making a communication to the public:

An act of communication such as that made by the manager of a website by means of clickable links is aimed at all potential users of the site managed by that person, that is to say, an indeterminate and fairly large number of recipients. In those circumstances, it must be held that the manager is making a communication to a public.

However, the Court notes that in its earlier decisions it held that when a work  is “re-communicated” by the same technical means, the communication should be directed at a “new” public:

“[A] communication, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, concerning the same works as those covered by the initial communication and made, as in the case of the initial communication, on the Internet, and therefore by the same technical means, must also be directed at a new public, that is to say, at a public that was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication to the public [...].”

The Court then goes on to say that in this particular case, there was no new public. As the work that was linked to was available to everyone on the internet, without any “restrictive measures”, no new public was reached with the communication. In a complicated paragraph the Court then says that if the linked-to content can be accessed by internet users directly on the original site, regardless of the website that provided the link, then those internet users are not a new public:

“In those circumstances, it must be held that, where all the users of another site to whom the works at issue have been communicated by means of a clickable link could access those works directly on the site on which they were initially communicated, without the involvement of the manager of that other site, the users of the site managed by the latter must be deemed to be potential recipients of the initial communication and, therefore, as being part of the public taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication.”

On this issue, the Court concludes that:

“Therefore, since there is no new public, the authorisation of the copyright holders is not required for a communication to the public such as that in the main proceedings.”

Here’s where my first question arises: The Court says that linking is a communication to the public. But if the act of linking does not reach a new public, then “authorisation of the copyright holders is not required.” The Court here almost seems to present non-new-public-linking as an exception to the right of communication. I am assuming that this is not what the Court means. But, what does the Court mean?

Also when dealing with “framing”, of which the Court says that it makes no difference, the Court again notes that no authorization is needed for non-new-public-linking:

That additional circumstance in no way alters the conclusion that the provision on a site of a clickable link to a protected work published and freely accessible on another site has the effect of making that work available to users of the first site and that it therefore constitutes a communication to the public. However, since there is no new public, the authorisation of the copyright holders is in any event not required for such a communication to the public.

My second question is on the Court’s paragraph in which it draws the mirror image of its conclusion:

On the other hand, where a clickable link makes it possible for users of the site on which that link appears to circumvent restrictions put in place by the site on which the protected work appears in order to restrict public access to that work to the latter site’s subscribers only, and the link accordingly constitutes an intervention without which those users would not be able to access the works transmitted, all those users must be deemed to be a new public, which was not taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication, and accordingly the holders’ authorisation is required for such a communication to the public. This is the case, in particular, where the work is no longer available to the public on the site on which it was initially communicated or where it is henceforth available on that site only to a restricted public, while being accessible on another Internet site without the copyright holders’ authorisation.

The Court, in the first sentence seems to focus on links that “circumvent restrictions put in place” on the original website that is linked to. In such a case, a new public is reached through linking to that content, because this part of the public was not considered when the original communication was authorized. The examples that popped up in my head were: circumventing a paywall, or linking to content that is otherwise closed to the general public, for instance by requiring a password for access to the content.

However, in the second part in which the Court explains what it means with its mirror-image, the Court seems to argue that other types of linking may too be an infringement of the right of communication to the public.

This is the case, in particular, where the work is no longer available to the public on the site on which it was initially communicated or where it is henceforth available on that site only to a restricted public, while being accessible on another Internet site without the copyright holders’ authorisation.

Linking to non-authorized content, when that content is available from an authorized source elsewhere, thus seems to reach a new public and may be a communication to the public. Thus, linking to unauthorized communications is not safe? This relates to what Martin Husovec notes when he speaks of the “assumption of the authorized source” that the Court has in dealing with the Svensson-questions.

That’s it for now. I am sure the exact meaning of the Court’s decision will be hotly-debated during the upcoming days, weeks, months and years…